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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Tests for
Identity of Offense.
Defendant was indicted for larceny of six bushels of corn. He
pleaded autrefois acquit, contending that he had previously been indicted for the identical offense. Held, plea good; the two offenses
grew out of the same transaction and only one indictment can be
sustained therefor.1
Three principal tests for the identity of offenses have been applied
by the courts. (1) The "same evidence" rule inquires whether defendant could have been convicted on the first indictment upon proof
of the facts alleged in the second. 2 (2) The "same transaction" test
asks whether the crimes grew out of a single transaction.3 (3) The
"lessential element" test looks to whether the first prosecution was for
any essential part or whole of the crime prosecuted in the second indictment. 4 Some courts use these as interchangeable, some as
mutually exclusive, 6 and others as over lapping.7 An application of.
these rules to concrete fact situations reveals some interesting results.
1
2

Harris v. State, 159 S. E. 603 (Ga. 1931).

Winn v. State, 82 Wis. 571, 52 N. W. 775 (1892); Barker v. State, 189
Ind. 263, 120 N. E. 593 (1918) ; 16 Coaius Junis 264; CLARK, CRIMINAL PROcmurP (2nd ed. 1923), 457; 1 BIsHoP, CRI.MNAL LAw (9th ed. 1923)
§1052. The North Carolina rule is stated by Ruffin, J., in State v. Nash, 86
N. C. 650, 41 Am. Rep. 472 (1882): "the true test is, 'could the defendant
have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts, not as
brought forward in evidence, but as alleged in the record of the second'."
'It is a fundamental rule of law that out of the same facts a series of
charges shall not be preferred," Cockburn, J., in Regina v. Elrington, 1 B. & S.
688, 9 Cox C. C. 86 (1861); Jones v. State, 55 Ga. 625 (1876); Newton v.
Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 707, 249 S.W. 1017 (1923) ; State v. Keep, 85 Ore.
265, 166 Pac. 936 (1917); 16 CoRaus Juais 272; 1 BisnoP, CRIMINAL LAw
(9th ed. 1923) §1051.
'"It is elementary to say that a prosecution for any part of a single crime
bars any further prosecution based upon the whole or part of the crime,"
Hurt, C. J., in Runyon v. Morrow, 192 Ky. 785, 234 S. W. 304, 19 A. L. R.
632 (1921) ; U. S. v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992 (N. D. Ill. 1923) ; Sanford v. State,
75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918) ; State v. Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138, 223 Pac. 762
(1924) ; 16 CoRus Jums 270.
'Mitchell v. State, 16 Ala. App. 635, 80 So. 730 (1918) (The first decision
of the court was based on a combination of the "essential element" and "same
transaction" tests, while a rehearing rested its decision on the "same evidence!"
test.) ; State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879) ; Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 101 Ky.
603, 42 S.W. 117 (1897) ; Arrington v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 96, 12 S.E. 224
(1890).
' Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S.632, 35 Sup. Ct. 712, 59 L. ed. 1153 (1915);
U. S. v. Farhat, 269 Fed. 33 (S.D. Ohio 1920) ; Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 9
(1853) ; Foran v. State, 195 Ind. 55, 144 N. E. 529 (1924) ; State v. Jacobson,
197 Iowa 1028, 198 N. W. 329 (1924).
" Autrefois acquit is only available in cases where the transaction is the
same and the two indictments are susceptible of, and must be sustained by the
same proof," White, P. J., in Simco. v. State, 9 Tex. App. at 348 (1880);
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In a 1931 federal case 8 defendant was indicted for illegally selling
morphine. Three counts were based on a statute requiring sales to
be from the original package, and others on a statute requiring a
government order before any sale. The sales were on successive days
to the government detective. An application of the "same evidence"
test allowed conviction on all counts.9 The same facts would have
given rise to an identical holding under the "essential element" test,
The sale without order was in no way an integral part of the sale
from an illegal package. In analogous situations under the "same
transaction" rule the series of sales might be considered one offense 10
or several. 1
In California, a defendant was indicted for attempting to murder
his wife. By the shot intended for her, he killed another person.
On the murder indictment he pleaded the attempt indictment as
former jeopardy.' 2 The "same evidence" rule would not allow the
plea. If a murder was proved to have been committed by defendant,
it could not have convicted him on the first trial for an attempt on the
life of another. Nor is an attempt on one person's life in any way an
"'essential element" of the murder of another. On the "same transaction" test a division of opinion exists,' 3 but some courts would hold
14
but one offense indictable.
"The rule is that where one offense is a necessary element in, and constitutes
part of another and both are in fact one transaction, an acquittal or conviction
of one should bar prosecution for the other," Snow, J., in People v. Cook, 236
Mich. 333, 210 N. W. 296 (1926); State v. Foster, 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255
k(1924)
; State v. Shaver, 197 Iowa 1028, 198 N. W. 329 (1924).
8
Blockburger v. U. S., 50 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
' "It cannot be said that the evidence necessary to establish the truth of
-either of the two counts in controversy would establish the other, for indeed
the opposite is true," Sparks, J., in Blockburger v. U. S., vpra note 8.
"o"I do not think the penalty section of the statute contemplates such double
punishment for the same transaction .... I believe that this 'one and continuous
performance,' initiated and enacted under the 'personal direction' of the government agent, and financed by the government, represents but a single infraction of the law," Alschuyler, J., dissenting in Blockburger v. U. S., supra
note 8; State v. Needham, 194 Mo. App. 201, 186 S. W. 585 (1916) ; State v.
Covington, 147 Tenn. 659, 222 S. W. 1 (1920); State v. Linton, 283 Mo. 1,
217 S.W. 874 (1920).

4Bowman v. State, 23 Ala. App. 504, 127 So. 911 (1930) ; State v. Cleaver,

196 Iowa 1278, 196 N. W. 119 (1923) ; State v. Wilbur, 85 Ore. 565, 166 Pac.
51 (1917) ; State v. Keep, supra note 3, See State v. Sepanic, 117 Kans. at
110, 230 Pac. at 306 (1924).
"People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924).
"Note (1922) 20 A. L. R. 341; Note (1883) 41 Am. Rep. 475.
" "The same transaction test adopted in this state may make a trial for the
murder of one person a bar to the prosecution for assault with intent to murder a different person. For instance, if they defendant shot at A, intending to
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Suppose a defendant has killed three persons by rapidly successive
shots, and pleads acquittal for A's murder in defense of that of C.15
Proof of the missiles striking each of the three would be entirely
different, thus three indictments would lie on the "same evidence"
rule. 16 The act in relation to one of the three was no "essential" part
of the act in relation to another, hence three indictments lie on the
"essential element" rule. Conceding three transactions to have taken
place, each shot constituting one, the question arises as to what would
be the situation where one shot kills three persons. Some courts
have carried the "same transaction" test to its logical conclusion and
17
would, on a basis of previous decisions, sustain but one indictment.
The "same transaction" test then is flexible, leaving to the court
the definition of a single transaction. But the other tests are also
flexible, changing with application. From a practical standpoint the
courts in effect reach the same conclusions on any of the tests, with
the possible exception, as noted, of the "same transaction" test, where
several offenses grow out of the same act.
ERNEST W. EWBANX, JR.
Criminal Law-Quashing Indictment for Incompetent
Evidence Before Grand July.
The defendant moved to quash his indictment on the ground that
all the evidence (testimony of two witnesses) heard by the grand jury
was hearsay and incompetent. Motion denied, and, in affirming, the
Supreme Court held: There is a distinction to be made between inkill him, and by reason of bad marksmanship struck and killed B, whom he
did not intend to kill, the transaction, the assault with intent to kill A and the
actual murder of B are legally the same." Powell, J., in Burnam v. State, 2
Ga. App. 395, 58 S.E. 683 (1907) ; Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632
(1896) (the court draws the distinction here between a situation where two

shots are fired and where only one occurs) ; Hurst v. State, 86 Ala. 604, 6 So.
120 (1889) ; Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873).
-State v. Corbett, 117 S.C. 356, 109 S.E. 133, 20 A. L. R. 328 (1921).

" The court's decision rested on an application of the "same evidence" test,
it being held that a different proof was necessary in the case of each murder.
ITThe following cases represent the development of the rule in Georgia:
Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8 (1853) ; Holt v. State, 38 Ga. 187 (1868) ; Knight
v. State, 73 Ga. 804 (1884) ; Lock v. State, 122 Ga. 730, 50 S. E. 932 (1905) ;
Burnam v. State, supra note 14; see 1 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923)
§1064.

It appears in Lillie v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. Rep. 615 at 616, 187 S. W.

482 at 483 (1916), that in the opinion of the court, if two persons are killed or
injured by the same shot, a conviction of the murder or assault of one of them
would be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the murder or assault of the
other. The cases of Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 466 46 S. W. 639
(1898) ; and Wright v. State, 17 Tex. App. 152 (1884), would sustain but one
conviction on a plea of autrefois convict.

